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[Appearing below are selected portions of a set of common questions and responses regarding
Nicaragua's electoral process culminating in the Feb. 25, 1990 general elections distributed Sept.
5 by Agendas International (New York, NY). The report by Agendas International is based in
part on an analysis by Hemisphere Initiatives titled, "Establishing the Ground Rules: A Report
on the Nicaraguan Electoral Process."] Q. Were not the Sandinistas responsible for establishing
minimal requirements for legalization of political parties that encouraged fragmentation, and thus
the impossibility of one party obtaining a majority? A. The Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) has consistently advocated more stringent requirements for political groups soliciting legal
party status. In the October 1988 Electoral Law, the FSLN originally proposed that a party must
receive 5% of the vote to obtain representation in the National Assembly. The 1988 legislation
required groups soliciting legal status to have established party organizations in all nine regions,
all 14 departments and all 139 municipalities. This organizational structure required a minimum
of 850 party members. The FSLN also proposed that campaign funds be allocated according to
voting strength. Under the April 1989 electoral reforms, an expedited procedure was established
for the 1989/90 electoral process. The new requirements for political party legalization are less
rigorous and came in response to opposition demands. The opposition complained that the 1988
legislation imposed almost insurmountable difficulties for parties to obtain legal status. The April
reforms require party organizations at the national level and in the nine regions, thereby reducing
minimum party membership to a few dozen. Q. The person who wields real control on the Supreme
Electoral Council (SEC) is the president. Since this person is a Sandinista, isn't it accurate to say
that he will use his position to advance the interests of the FSLN? A. The SEC president's duties
are primarily administrative. In its July 1989 analysis of Nicaragua's electoral law reforms, a United
Nations technical mission reached the following conclusion: "The topic of the CSE presidency, in
spite of the intensity with which the subject is at times discussed, does not appear to be of great
importance...The functions of the CSE president are...of administration, subordinate to the collegiate
body; any abuse by the president would be rectified immediately by Council decisions that the
president could not fail to heed." Q. The Sandinistas control the largest standing army in Central
America. Shouldn't they be excluded from voting since they will certainly follow the directives of
their superiors who are militant Sandinistas? A. This topic was also addressed in the UN technical
mission's report. The report said, "the opposition demand that military personnel be prohibited
from voting does not seem reasonable." The UN mission pointed out Nicaragua's exceptional
circumstances, mainly a large-scale mobilization of youth into the military to fight contra forces for
the past eight years. Next, the number of Nicaraguans serving in the military is such that denying
them the right to vote would adversely affect the principle of universal sufferage. The August
political agreement confirms that military personnel must both register and vote at the nearest voter
precinct and not on military bases. Q. Why have the Sandinistas prohibited Nicaraguans who left
the country to escape the war and poor economic conditions from casting absentee ballots? Are
they afraid the refugees will vote against the FSLN? A. This is not an unusual situation for Central
America. Not a single Central American country, including Costa Rica, permits absentee voting.
Nicaraguan legislation, in fact, is more liberal than that of other Central American countries in that
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it permits Nicaraguans to register abroad. Once registered, Nicaraguans are free to return home and
vote. In addition, in marked contrast with its neighbors, the Nicaraguan government is working with
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international
organizations to provide guarantees for the safety of refugees, opposition figures, and members
of the Nicaraguan Resistance, who wish to return to Nicaragua permanently, or temporarily in
order to vote. Q. Isn't it accurate to say that the Sandinistas have restricted foreign financial aid to
the opposition because they fear losing the elections? A. The October 1988 Election Law allocated
government funds to political parties in accordance with previous election results. It also prohibited
receipt of any foreign funds by political parties and specified that domestic contributions must
come from individuals rather than organizations. The opposition was particularly critical of these
provisions, despite the fact that many countries, including the US, prohibit foreign financing of
political campaigns. Under the April 1989 reforms, political parties and coalitions may receive
unlimited foreign contributions, but all contributions must be administered through the CSE and
are subject to an electoral tax. Under CSE regulations, 50% of all cash donations would go to the
parties soliciting the contributions, while the other 50% would go into a "Fund for Democracy"
to be used to cover the administrative costs of the election. A separate procedure has also been
established for capital goods and in kind donations. Next, parties are exonerated from taxes on
original donations totaling up to a value of US$20,000. The April reforms also changed the formula
for distributing government monies so that 50% of these funds will be divided equally among the
parties or alliances, while the other 50% will be allocated according to their electoral performance
in the prior election. The August agreement did not alter the laws governing campaign financing.
Q. How can the opposition have a chance to get its views out to the people when the Sandinistas
control all TV stations, most of the major newspapers, radio stations, etc.? A. Opposition parties
wanted an independent, opposition-controlled TV station to compete with the two state-controlled
stations. They wanted no limits on the amount of advertising time that could be purchased from
private radio stations. They wanted equal access, not the Sandinista proposed system that time be
granted on the basis on previous vote totals. Under the April 1989 electoral and media reform laws,
the government agreed to make one of the two state-owned TV stations available to the opposition
from August 25 to election date. The political agreement also directs the CSE to provide (between
August 25 and December 2) 30 minutes of free TV programming every evening to be distributed
equally among the political parties or alliances. These programs began to be aired on Channel 6 on
August 25. Q. No matter what laws are passed or agreements signed by the Sandinistas, the fact is
that the Sandinistas have never kept their word or lived up to any agreement which they signed.
Why should anyone believe them now? A. Aside from the dubious nature of claims regarding the
Sandinistas' failure to abide by previous agreements, it is not necessary in this case to rely on the
government's commitment to compliance. The Nicaraguan government has invited the United
Nations and the Organization of American States to act as official observers to the electoral process
and the 1990 elections. In the 1987 Esquipulas II regional accords, the Central American presidents
themselves designated the OAS and the UN as the organizations responsible for verifying the
purity of elections in region. The OAS has already established permanent observer teams in each
of Nicaragua's departments and in late August, 13 UN officials began permanent monitoring of the
electoral process. Participation of UN monitors to observe elections in a sovereign country is without
precedent. In addition, former US president Jimmy Carter has been invited to head a delegation of
observers in Nicaragua at any time during the electoral process. He and his delegation were given
guarantees of freedom of movement, and unrestricted access to all voting areas.
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